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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ____________ 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 In this case, the clerk of the district court sent 
timely notice that a judgment had been entered to the plaintiff's 
local counsel but not to the out-of-state lawyer who had 
primarily handled the litigation.  Because the time for appeal 
had expired, the out-of-state lawyer requested an extension.  In 
denying the motion, the district court read the applicable 
procedural rules as precluding relief when one of a party's 
lawyer had received notice.  We agree and affirm. 
 Plaintiff was a patron at the defendant's gambling 
casino in Atlantic City, New Jersey, where he played a slot 
machine called "Pokermania."  The machine provided for jackpots 
  
when the screen displayed images of cards that would be winning 
hands in a poker game, among them a royal flush.   
 While plaintiff was playing, the machine displayed an 
image of these five cards, in order:  Ace, King, Queen, Jack, and 
Ten of Hearts.  He then asked for payment of the primary 
progressive jackpot, at that time worth $187,736.60, but the 
defendant paid only the secondary jackpot of $1,046.42.  
Defendant took the position that a sign on the machine stated 
that the large award was for a "sequential heart royal flush (10, 
J., Q, K, A)" and that, because  the plaintiff's winning hand was 
in the reverse order (Ace, King, Queen, Jack, Ten), he did not 
qualify.   
 Plaintiff filed a diversity suit in the district court 
of New Jersey, alleging breach of contract, fraud, and violations  
of the state consumer fraud act.  The district court granted 
summary judgment to defendant, concluding that plaintiff did not 
have a private right of action under the state's Casino Control 
Act, that the common law claim was preempted by the Act, and that 
plaintiff was not entitled to recover in any event.   
 The judgment was docketed on March 30, 1994, and the 
court clerk sent timely notice to the plaintiff's local counsel, 
Kenneth F. Hense, of the law firm of McGlynn Reed Hense & Pecora, 
whose office was located in Point Pleasant, New Jersey.  However, 
the clerk did not send a notice to the plaintiff's principal 
counsel, Morris M. Goldings, of the law firm of Mahoney, Hawkes & 
Goldings, whose office was located in Boston, Massachusetts.   
  
 Mr. Goldings first learned of the entry of the summary 
judgment on June 10, 1994 in a telephone conversation with the 
defendant's lawyer.  After verifying the fact that his local 
counsel, Mr. Hense, had indeed received the notice but had not 
communicated that information, Mr. Goldings filed a motion on 
June 17, 1994, to reopen the time for appeal pursuant to Fed. R. 
App. P. 4(a)(6). 
 In an affidavit attached to his motion, Mr. Goldings 
explained that he had been admitted as counsel pro hac vice, had 
provided his name and address on all papers filed in the case, 
had received copies of prior notices directly from the clerk, and 
had appeared before the court.  Relying on the past practice of 
the clerk, he had expected to be directly notified of court 
orders. 
 The district court denied the motion, observing that 
Local Rule 4(C) provides that the clerk's office will send copies 
of court orders only to local counsel, even when out-of-state 
counsel has appeared pro hac vice.  The Rule thus imposes on 
local counsel the responsibility for transmitting information to 
out-of-state counsel.  The court also relied on the text of Fed. 
R. App. P. 4(a)(6) that the notice provision refers to "a party," 
not counsel.   
 Plaintiff has appealed both the order denying the 
extension of time and the entry of summary judgment.  He contends 
that, in the absence of prejudice to the defendant, the district 
court abused its discretion in refusing to enlarge the time for 
filing an appeal. 
  
 Federal Rule of Appellant Procedure 4(a)(6) provides as 
follows: 
 "The district court, if it finds (a) that a 
party entitled to notice of the entry of a 
judgment or order did not receive such notice 
from the clerk or any party within 21 days of 
its entry and (b) that no party would be 
prejudiced, may, upon motion filed within 180 
days of entry of the judgment or order or 
within 7 days of receipt of such notice, 
whichever is earlier, reopen the time for 
appeal for a period of 14 days from the date 
of entry of the order reopening the time for 
appeal."   
The Committee notes explain that this amendment, which was 
adopted in 1991, provides "a limited opportunity for relief" 
where a party has not received notice from the clerk.   
 Before the Rule was amended, parties had lost the right 
to appeal in a number of instances because of clerks' failures to 
send timely notice.  To mitigate this harsh result, some district 
courts resorted to the use of the "excusable neglect" language in 
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).  These 
efforts, however, were not favorably received by appellate 
courts, influenced to some extent by the compelling need for 
finality in litigation.  See, e.g., Alaska Limestone Corp. v. 
Hodel, 799 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1986); Pedereaux v. Doe, 767 F.2d 
50 (3d Cir. 1985); Hensley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 651 F.2d 
  
226 (4th Cir. 1981); Gooch v. Skelly Oil Co., 493 F.2d 366 (10th 
Cir. 1974).   
 Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) provides a mechanism for 
granting an extension of time when a party would be unfairly 
deprived of an appeal because of the failure of a court clerk.  
The procedure is not freely available because it was designed not 
to unduly affect the time when judgments become final.  As the 
Committee Note stresses, the "provision establishes an outer time 
limit of 180 days" within which a party who has not received 
notice of the entry of a judgment may request a limited 
extension.  As a way to reduce the 180-day period, however, the 
Rule provides that notice may be sent to adverse parties by a 
party who has learned of the judgment.  The Committee Note 
encouraged winning parties to follow this practice in order to 
prevent claims of injustice by adverse parties that received no 
notice from the clerk's office.   
 The careful balancing of interests revealed by the text 
and the Committee Note is a compelling reason for adherence to 
the language of the rule.  It is pertinent also that Congress 
amended 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c), in accordance with the Committee's 
suggestion, to reiterate the text of Rule 4(a)(6).  Thus, the 
procedure has both specific statutory and Rule authority. 
 The language of the Rule leaves no doubt as to the 
result to be reached here.  It is a "party" not given notice who 
is eligible for relief.  Here, the plaintiff was represented by 
two law firms, either of whom were authorized to receive notices 
on behalf of the client.  A "party is deemed bound by the acts of 
  
his lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of all facts, 
notice of which can be charged upon the attorney."  Pioneer 
Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Assoc., 113 S. Ct. 1489, 
1499 (1993) (internal quotations omitted).   
 Regrettably, the lack of communication that occurred 
here is not a unique circumstance.  In Alaska Limestone, 799 F.2d 
at 1412, the Court held that "receipt of notice by one of two 
counsel of record, as here, sufficiently informs the party of the 
entry of judgment."  The argument that relief should be granted 
when the party's "principal" counsel did not receive notice was 
rejected in Gooch, 493 F.2d at 370; see also Borowski v. DePuy, 
Inc., 876 F.2d 1339, 1341 (7th Cir. 1989) (local counsel's 
failure to forward a report was a "run of the mill oversight," 
rather than "excusable neglect").  Although these rulings were in 
cases citing Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), 
the holdings are equally applicable to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). 
 Plaintiff's counsel laments that defendant's opposition 
to the motion to extend the time is inconsistent "with the spirit 
of professional collegiality" which was the norm in the practice 
of law twenty years ago.  We do not approve of the "hardball" 
tactics unfortunately used by some law firms today.  The 
extension of normal courtesies and exercise of civility expedite 
litigation and are of substantial benefit to the administration 
of justice.   
 The Code of Trial Conduct adopted by the American 
College of Trial Lawyers in 1987 expresses a desirable standard:  
  
 "To opposing counsel, a lawyer owes the duty of 
courtesy, candor in the pursuit of the truth, 
cooperation in all respects not inconsistent with [the] 
client's interests and scrupulous observance of all 
mutual understandings. 
  . . .     
  The lawyer, and not the client, has the sole 
discretion to determine the accommodations to be 
granted opposing counsel in all matters not directly 
affecting the merits of the cause or prejudicing the 
client's rights, such as extensions of time, 
continuances, adjournments and admission of facts." 
Code of Trial Conduct pmbl, § 12.   
 The case before us is, however, one in which counsel's 
failure to agree to an extension had no relevance.  The time 
limits provided by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107 
are "mandatory and jurisdictional," and the courts are required 
to dismiss untimely appeals sua sponte.  Browder v. Director, 
Ill. Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978).  The parties 
may not confer jurisdiction on the Court by consent.  
Consequently, even in the absence of opposition, the motion could 
not have been granted.1     
                     
1
.  In any event, as the Court of Appeals observed in Zimmer St. 
Louis, Inc. v. Zimmer Co., 32 F.3d 357, 361 (8th Cir. 1994), in 
similar circumstances, because the appellant's arguments on the 
merits of the claim against the appellee are not persuasive, an 
affirmance could be the only result if we were to reach the 
merits.   
  
 Accordingly, the order of the district court will be 
affirmed. 
 
